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bailor always retains legal title,S the bailee only having a special posses9
In a trust the trustee has legal title, and the cestui qui
sory interest.
0
It is obvious that one person cannot
trust only an equitable interest.'
hold legal title as a bailor and an equitable one as a cestui qui trust at the
same time that another holds legal title as trustee and a mere possessory
interest as bailee.
The court said that conceding that the benefits of this bailment might
be reciprocal, the bank "would be required to exercise the same diligence
in the care of appellee's bonds as it would in the care of its own securities." It has long been the law in Indiana that there are no degrees of
2
negligence."
In two recent cases1 it was held that there were no degrees
of diligence either, and that negligence was simply a failure to exercise
the same care an ordinary reasonably prudent person: would under exactly
the same circumstances. The principal case leads one to conjecture as to
whether the court intended to overrule these decisions and reestablish the
doctrine of degrees of diligence. When the court said that the trust company
was required to exercise the same care in respect to plaintiff's bonds as
it would in respect to its own, there, at least, it must have misstated its
position. This particular trust company may have been very careless with
its own securities. That surely would not affect the duty it owed the
plaintiff. The court undoubtedly meant that the bailor was under a duty
to exercise the same care that a reasonably prudent trust company would
use in the care of its own securities.
This, however, did not influence the result of the case, as the reversal
was based upon the doctrine that a special deposit can give rise to a preferred claim only when the property deposited or, if it has been sold, the
funds received for it, can be traced into the receiver's hands. That this
result is correct can hardly be doubted after an examination of the
W. H. H.
numerous cases the court cited.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EXTENDING TERM OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYThe appellant was elected prosecutor for the Johnson-Brown judicial district at the 1928 election, but his term of office did not commence until
January 1, 1930. By Acts 1929, page 49, it was provided that all terms of
prosecutors should commence on the first of January immediately following
the regular biennial election, and that in judicial districts where the term
of the prosecutor elected at the 1928 election did not expire until December,
1931, there should be no election for prosecutor in such district at the 1930
election. Appellee obtained nomination and election at the 1930 election,
regardless of the provisions of such act. Appellant brought this action
'Scott Mining etc. Co. v. Shultz, 67 Kans. 605, 73 Pac. 903 (1903) ; Hans v.
Shipiro, 168 N. C. 24, 84 S. E. 33 (1915) ; In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 211
Fed. 908 (1914) ; Northcut v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. 259, 131 S. W. 1128 (1910) ; Anderson v. Pacific Bank, supra, note 4.
SPhiladelphiaLamp Co. v. Del. Mar. Supply Co., 5 Boyce (Del.) 81, 90 AUt. 595
(1914) ; Engel v.Scott, 60 Minn. 39, 61 N. E. 825 (1895).
"Hospes v. Y. W. Mfg. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117 (1892) ; Hawkins v.
Donnerberg, 40 Ore. 97, 66 Pac. 691 (1901) ; Wallace v. Wainwright, 87 Pa. St. 263
(1878).

"Bedford, etc. R. P.. Co. v. Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551 (1885).
12 Union Traction Co. v. Berry, Adm., 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655 (1919);
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Stephens, 86 Ind. App. 251, 157 N. E. 58 (1927).
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under the declaratory judgment act to determine which one of the parties
had the right to the office. The trial court held for the appellee, elected
at the 1930 election, holding the 1929 act unconstitutional. Held, the act
of 1929 extending term is unconstitutional.1
There were two majority opinions which, upon careful reading, seem to
base their decision upon the same principle, and differ only upon interpretation of authority, statutes, and constitutional provisions used to justify
the use of the basic principle, viz., that the voters have a right or privilege
to vote for prosecuting attorneys at general elections. Any distinction
between the two opinions as to the use of this principle seems to be based
more on differences of the form of language than upon material differences
in substance. There was a dissenting opinion, well reasoned, but unfortunately the majority of the authorities cited had to do with offices of
legislative creation, and not of constitutional origin, so that the authortiy
for the decision was quite slender, and it might have been a stronger
opinion had it rejected much of its authority and relied on its reasoning.
The cases of Gemmer v.State,2 Russell u. State ex rel. Crowder,3 used
in Judge Treanor's opinion, and Scott v. State ex rel. Gibbs,4 used in the
dissenting opinion are governed at least in part by Art. 6, Sec. 2, of the
Indiana Constitution, which has no application in the principal case, except
as reasoning based in part on other considerations. The case of State ex
rel Custer v. Schortemeier6 (vacancy of circuit judge), State ex rel. Gibson
v. Friedley7 (tenure of office fixed by the Constitution), Moser v. Longs
(Legislature cannot abolish or abridge term of constitutional office), are
not, as used in the majority opinions, exactly in point on the question at
issue. Most of the cases9 used in the dissenting opinion concern offices of
legislative creation, and for this reason, it might be argued that they are
not in point. The case of Wilson v. Clark,10 held that while the legislature cannot extend or abridge the terms of constitutional offices, nor postpone elections so long a time as to deprive them of their elective character,
the postponement for one year is not deemed to be an unreasonable nor
unnecessary time, nor to indicate a legislative design to make the office
appointive, rather than elective, when done for the proper purpose. This
case cited under similar provisions of the Kansas Constitution seems the
most nearly in point of any of the cases cited.
The question seems not to be: Was the legislature given the power to
do this; but more accurately: is there any prohibition in the Constitution
denying it such power so that it cannot do this? Article 7, Sec. 11, provides: "There shall be elected, in each judicial circuit, by the voters
1
Robinson v. Moser, Supreme Court of Indiana, December 31, 1931, 179 N.
E. 270.
2163 Ind. 150.
p171 Ind. 623.
0
'151 Ind. 556.
: 197 Ind. 507.
135 Ind. 119.
8 64 Ind. 189.
9State ex rel. Harrison v. Menaugh, 151 Ind. 260; Spencer v. Knight, 177 Inu.
564; Weaver v. State ex rel. Sims, 152 Ind. 479; State ex rel. Wilson v. Wells, 144
Ind. 232; State ex rel. Jordan v. Bailey, 37 Minn. 174, 33 N. W. 776; State ex rel.
Attorney General v. McGovney, 92 Mo. 428, 3 S. W. 867.
"63 Kans. 505, 65 Pac. 705.
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thereof, a Prosecuting Attorney, who shall hold his office for two years."
In the "Schedule," Sec. 6, it is provided: "The first general election under
this Constitution shall be held in the year one thousand eight hundred and
fifty-two," and in Sec. 9, "The first election for * * * prosecuting attorney * * * under this Constitution shall be held at the general election
in the year one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two

*

*

*."

These

latter two sections, by their very terms, and by the nature of the "Schedule"
in which they appear were for the purpose of starting the new government
in smooth operation. Any protection to be derived from it ceased when
that purpose was attained. This leaves Art. 7, Sec. 11 operative as to
prosecuting attorneys. Is this provision self-executing? It seems obvious
that it is not. Therefore, it would require legislative action, providing for
elections, after the first election provided for in the schedule. Suppose that
the legislature repealed the election laws, and refused to provide for any
elections for prosecuting attorneys. Under what authority could elections
for such office be held? The courts could not mandate the legislature to
provide for such election. There is no express provision in the Constitution to take care of such a situation, unless it would be Article 15, See. 3,
that "such officer shall hold his office for such term and until his successor
shall have been elected and qualified," or under Article 5, Sec. 18, which
provides that in case of a vacancy, the "Governor shall fill such vacancy,
by appointment, which shall expire, when a successor shall have been
elected and qualified." But would not this be questionable under the express terms of Article 7, See. 11, which provides that "there shall be
elected

*

*

*

a

prosecuting attorney

*

*

*

'."

Neither of these

possibilities would provide for an election. The question of what could be
done if the legislature refused to provide for such an election still remains
(except for the solution of electing, at the proper time, a new and more
tractable legislature). There remains then, but one other solution, and
upon this the court in effect acted, although apparently overlooking it.
The voter may be protected under due process. This involves the extension
of the protection of due process to political rights and privileges, which is
a marked extension of the principles of Constitutional law. Did the court
consider Article 1, See. 12, that "* * * every man, for injury done to
him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law"?
The writer had difficulty in following what appeared to be an argument
in the majority opinions for the implication, as a part of the Constitution,
that prosecuting attorneys must be elected at a general election for a two
year term, yet if there was such a provision in the Constitution, though
implied, it would seem that any law providing for the skipping of such
election would be contrary to the Constitution, and could be declared void.
Apparently, however, the court, in the majority opinions, did not ground
the decision on this point, but, after elaborating to some extent on such
a possibility, sidled away from it, and enunciated as the basic principle
for the decision the right or privilege of the voter to vote for such officer
at such election, which, in fact, moves the decision into the field of due
process.
While it is admitted that if this law had been upheld, it would have
made it possible for each succeeding legislature of different political faith,
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or profession of faith, to have juggled the term to suit its "best" interests,
the question is not whether this is desirable, but whether or not there is
anything to prevent it within the terms of the Indiana Constitution. It
seems, therefore, that with the exception of the due process interpretation,
the law in question here was not unconstitutional, under the decision as
set out in the principal case, and that to take care of the vacancy created,
Article 15, Sec. 3, should have been applied.
L. H. W.
CONSTITUTIONlAL LAw-TAxATioN-Wisconsin attempted to tax plaintiff's income on the basis of the combined total of his income and that of
his wife. Held, unconstitutional, contrary to due process.
The state law
provided that in computing income tax, the income tax of married persons
shall be computed on the combined average taxable income of husband and
wife.2 Taxes levied shall be payable by such husband, or head of the
family, but if not paid by him may be enforced against any person whose
income is included within the tax computation. The assessor asserted
against the plaintiff, a tax computed on the combined total of his and his
wife's income as shown by separate returns, treating the aggregate as
the income of the husband. The amount so ascertained and assessed exceeded the sum of taxes which would have been due had their taxable
incomes been separately assessed. This resulted from the fact that the
statute in question provides for surtaxes graduated according to the amount
of the taxpayer's net income. The greater the income, the higher the tax
paid. Plaintiff paid the tax under protest, and seeks to recover so much
thereof as was in excess of the tax computed on his own separate income.
He asserted that the statute, as applied to him, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin overruled this contention,3
and plaintiff appealed. The United States-Supreme Court held that since
the state had taken from the marriage status, except in its purely social
aspects, all the elements which differentiated the status of the married
person from that of the single person, a mere difference in social relations
does not so alter the taxable status of one receiving income as to justify a
different measure for the tax. Therefore, the classification was arbitrary,
discriminatory, and a denial of due process.
By the law of Wisconsin,4 a wife's property is her own-and she may
convey, devise or bequeath same as though she were unmarried. Since in
law and in fact, her income is her separate property, the question is
whether the state has the power by an income tax law to measure the
husband's tax-not by his own income-but, in part, by that of another.
Any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property or
income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to
due process.5 That which is not income cannot be made such by calling it
income. 6 Although the Wisconsin court sustained the statute in question 7
on the ground that the provisions under attack are necessary to prevent
1

Hoeper v.
2Wisconsin
3Hoepe-r v.
4Wisconsin

Tax Com of Wisconsin, 52 Sp.
Statutes, 1929, No. 71.05, subd.
Tax Cornmission, 202 Wis. 493
Statutes, 1929. No. 246.01-.05.
6Knoowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 77.
.ichols v. Coflidge, 274 U. S. 531.
THoeper v. Tax Commission, 202 'Wis. 493

Ct. Rep. 120 (1931).
2 (d), and No. 71.09, subd. 4 (c).
(1930).

(1930).

